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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States enjoys a peaceful, constitutional and democratic government.
However, for some Americans, there is a predicament: they are subject to the laws
enacted by the peoples' Representatives, yet are excluded from the electoral process.
Due to a felony conviction, many citizens are barred from the ballot box, sometimes for
life. This process of withdrawing an individual's voting privileges as a collateral
consequence of a criminal conviction is known as disenfranchisement.2 A single
criminal transgression by a teenager can permit disenfranchisement, even into his or her
senior years. In some cases, a felony conviction eliminates the right to vote in one state,
while a neighboring state does not even designate the offense as particularly grave. The
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2 Felon disenfranchisement has a lengthy history dating back to the Roman practice of infamia. JEFF
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 23 (2006); Symposium, The Future of Punishment, Disenfranchisement as a Punishment:
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1899 (1999). Infamia juris resulted
from violations of the law. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 328 (1983). "Under Roman tradition, honor implied
possessing all rights of a citizen, i.e., the panoply of political rights available. The loss of honor, therefore,
connoted the loss of one's position as a citizen." Nora A. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt
to Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative. 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 757
(2000). Infamia juris indicated such a loss of honor, and subsequently the loss of complete rights of
citizenship. The tradition of infamia traveled to the new world and became prevalent in the United States,
beginning in the middle of the Nineteenth Century. Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the
'Menace of Negro Domination': Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-
2002, 109 AM. J. SOCIO. 559, 561 (2003). The first instances of disenfranchisement occurred in late
colonial times; beginning in 1818, Connecticut appears to have been one of the first states to impose ballot
restrictions. Id. at 565. The next two decades saw dramatic increases in the number of disenfranchisement
statutes; by the end of the 1840s, more than one-third of the states imposed disenfranchisement upon felons
residing within their borders. Id. at 567. The period following the American Civil War ushered in a variety
of ballot restrictive mechanisms, including an ever-expanding range of criminal disenfranchisement
statutes. "Upon adoption of the Reconstruction amendments, Southern states developed means to
disenfranchise blacks without violating the language of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . Among other
methods . . . [these states] passed legislation barring those with certain criminal convictions from voting."
Demleitner, supra at 776. Frequently there was disparate treatment between what was viewed as "white"
crime as opposed to "black" crime. Id.
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variety of felon disenfranchisement policies present among differing American
jurisdictions implicates questions of consistency and proportionality, as well as aids in
determining whether individuals and communities are marked for inclusion or exclusion.
In addition to challenging other restrictive voting regulations such as literacy tests
and poll taxes, litigants have lodged a host of claims seeking to end the practice of felon
disenfranchisement. Early commentary3 and litigation4 designed to attack felon
disenfranchisement pursued a constitutional theory, an approach to which the Supreme
Court dealt a serious blow in Richardson v. Ramirez.5 In Richardson, Justice Rehnquist
crafted a blanket rule holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 6 did not reach felon
disenfranchisement. While the Court clarified its position in Hunter v. Underwood,8 an
opinion also authored by Justice Rehnquist, by holding states' schemes violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment if discriminatory intent motivated the passage of the statute,9 the
current Court has provided little indication that it intends to revisit this core
constitutional question.
The combined holdings of Richardson and Hunter, however, did not end
challenges to disenfranchisement. Instead, a second-order wave of commentators
continues to address the legality of these state statutes.10 Their efforts no longer directly
3 See, e.g., Stephen B. Moldof, Note, Constitutional Law-Disenfranchisement of Felons-Felon's Challenge
to State Law Disenfranchising Felons Held Not to Raise Substantial Federal Question, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 423, 424 (1968); Gary L. Rebeck, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25
STAN. L. REV. 845, 846 (1973); Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 83
YALE L.J. 580, 585-88 (1974).
4 E.g., Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (indicating New Jersey
disenfranchisement statute violates equal protection).
'418 U.S. 24 (1974).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.7 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
8 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
9Id.
'0 See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. LJ. 259 (2004) (discussing
courts' reliance upon Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict the VRA and thus provide
authority for felon disenfranchisement laws, and arguing that ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment
effectively repealed Section 2, removing any such constitutional authority for disenfranchisement); John R.
Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felony Disenfranchisement, 26 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 157 (2004) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement laws may violate the Equal
Protection, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Bill of Attainder clauses of the Constitution, as well as
the Nineteenth Amendment's prohibition on denial of the right to vote based on sex); Virginia E. Hench,
The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
727 (1988) (arguing that racial bias in the criminal justice system and the United States Supreme Court's
color-blind jurisprudence combine with felon disenfranchisement laws to violate the Equal Protection
clause and effectively nullify the VRA); Angela Behrens, Note, Voting-Not Quite A Fundamental Right? A
Look at Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2004)
(arguing that the persistence of felon disenfranchisement laws undermines the classification of voting as a
fundamental right); Developments in the Law-One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2002) (highlighting disproportional disenfranchisement of
African Americans); Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisenent-A Race Neutral Punishment For Felony
Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 359 (2002) (discussing
the history of felon disenfranchisement laws and arguing that as such laws serve to diminish the minority
vote, they are in violation of the VRA and are unconstitutional violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments); Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the Black
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concentrate on the Reconstruction Amendments;" instead, more recent focus surrounds
use of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).12 Specifically, many scholars and litigants
argue that when Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA in 1982, thereby adopting a
flexible and fact intensive totality of the circumstances test,13 it created a statutory
scheme that could allow for the invalidation of certain state disenfranchisement laws.
14
In the federal courts, cases pursuing this VRA approach generally have been
unsuccessful.1 5  Many reviewing courts resist VRA claims by questioning not only
whether the federal Congress possesses the constitutional authority under the
Reconstruction Amendments to implement a statute designed to strike a state-level felon
disenfranchisement scheme, but also whether Congress so exercised that authority
through the VRA. 6 The collective failure of more than thirty years of constitutional and
Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145 (1994) (examining the statistical impact of
felon disenfranchisement laws on the black vote, examines possible causes for disproportionate
imprisonment rates of African Americans, and proposing a framework for evaluation of ex-felon
disenfranchisement statutes under the VRA); Afi S. Johnson-Parris, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement: The
Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89 VA. L. REV. 109 (2003) (arguing that the stigma attached to
the reduced level of citizenship resulting from statutes permanently disenfranchising felons breaches the
social contract by preventing the integration of ex-felons into society); Nathan P. Litwin, Note and
Comment, Defending an Unjust System: How Johnson v. Bush Upheld Felon Disenfranchisement and
Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 236 (2003) (arguing that Johnson v. Bush,
214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002), was wrongly decided in light of the felon disenfranchisement
statute's disproportionate impact on African Americans, particularly in the 2000 Presidential election);
Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New
Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993) (discussing the shift from a discriminatory intent inquiry to a results-
based inquiry in evaluation of validity of felon disenfranchisement laws in the wake of the VRA).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV (amending United States Constitution during post-Civil War
reconstruction).
12 Pub. L. No. 99, 79 Stat. 445, current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2003). "No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right on any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color .... Id. at § 1973(a).
1 See id. at § 1973(b) ("A violation ... is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice ......
14 See generally, Hench, supra note 10; Shapiro, supra note 10.
"5 See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 315-17 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that VRA's prohibition of denial of
voter qualification based on race does not apply to state felon disenfranchisement); Johnson v. Governor of
Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Bush, 126 S. Ct.
650 (2005) (prohibiting denial of vote based on race under the VRA does not apply to state felon
disenfranchisement); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F. 3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003), remanded sub nom.
to Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 2006 WL 1889273, *1 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006) (granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment as VRA Section 2 totality of circumstances test indicates Washington's felon
disenfranchisement law does not result in racial discrimination); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261
(6th Cir. 1986) (holding Tennessee felon disenfranchisement law does not violate VRA based on totality of
circumstances test).
16 Cf City of Boerne v. Floreg, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court held Congress
exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it adopted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. Id. at 534-35. Although Congress must have wide latitude, the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the right for Congress to decide what constitutes
a violation of the Constitution. Id. at 518-20. But see Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two
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statutory based litigation leads some scholars to conclude that a judicial based restoration
strategy should be abandoned in favor of appeal to political authorities.' 7
This article attempts to save the litigation based approach by advancing a new
analysis, arguing that the VRA does in fact serve as the proper mechanism to invalidate
disenfranchisement statutes for at least the Congressional portion of the ballot. Rather
than predicate the scope of the VRA upon the reach of enabling provisions of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, this article narrowly focuses upon Congress's
power under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution 18 and the passage of the 1982
amendments to Section 2 of the VRA. Current legal challenges have ignored Article I,
Section 4, despite its position as an authority cited by the framers of the VRA." It is the
contention of this article that the Elections Clause should no longer be overlooked, as it is
this Constitutional provision that extends the reach of the VRA to felon
disenfranchisement.
Part II of this article steps back from an analysis of potential legal challenges to
disenfranchisement and considers the various powers that Congress could employ to
implement a statute aimed at preventing felon disenfranchisement; these sources of
authority include the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, and Article I,
Section 4 of the United States Constitution, as mentioned above. This section
demonstrates the significant limitations inherent in using the enabling provisions of the
Reconstruction Amendments as the basis for federal legislation. However, Part I
concludes by emphasizing Congress's Article I, Section 4 power, and argues that
pursuant to a long line of Supreme Court precedents 20 including, but not limited to,
Justice Black's opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell,21 Congress has the unambiguous
constitutional authority to pass a statute which enfranchises felons for the Congressional
portion of the election ballot.
Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725 (1998) (arguing that
the VRA continues to be valid following City of Boerne).
'7 See Jason Belmont Conn, Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the Legislatures, 10
MICH. J. RACE & L. 495, 496 (2005) ("[T]hese lawsuits rarely succeed, and because many state courts and
federal circuit courts have now rejected the strongest constitutional arguments against felon
disenfranchisement, voluminous case law fortifying felon disenfranchisement laws has developed .... In
contrast, significant potential for change exists in the state legislatures."). While concerned primarily with
an appeal to legislative authorities, the basic crux of this 2005 article has been bolstered by recent
developments in Florida, where appeals to the Governor resulted in franchise restoration of a significant
number of its ex-felons. See Abby Goodnough, In a Break From the Past, Florida Will Let Felons Vote,
NEW YORK TIMES, April 6, 2007, at A14.
's "The Times, Places and manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any Time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators," U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 2. This
provision is commonly referred to as the Elections Clause.rth
"The [VRA] is designed primarily to enforce the 15 amendment... and is also designed to enforce the
14 h amendment and article 1, section 4." H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437. The 1982 amendments eliminated the intent standard and provided a results test, again
relying, in part, on Article 1, Section 4. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 39 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 217. "The proposed amendment modifying a results test to Section 2 is a clearly constitutional
exercise of Congressional power under Article I and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment." Id.
20 See infra notes 30-33.
2 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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Part III reviews the history of the VRA and argues that the 1982 amendments to
Section 2 of the VRA allow that statute to reach felon disenfranchisement laws. Namely,
the amended VRA's invocation of Article I, Section 4 as a basis of authority 22 to
formulate the wide-reaching totality of circumstances standard 23 acts to immunize this
portion of a disenfranchisement challenge from the pitfalls that have previously doomed
VRA cases. 24 Specifically, the fusion of the Article I, Section 4 enabling power together
with the broad language of the VRA sidesteps the plain statement doctrine that doomed
several prior VRA cases. As a result, the invigorated Section 2 of the VRA reaches state
schemes that deny felons the Congressional franchise.
Part IV carries forward this theory, arguing that statutes imposing lifetime
disenfranchisement on all felons are per se violative of the totality of the circumstances
test. The article concludes with a brief review of empirical scholarship for the purpose of
describing the potential impacts upon electoral outcomes that might follow from
Congressional franchise restoration.
II. CONGRESS'S AVAILABLE POWERS TO REGULATE FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
While this article ultimately concerns whether Congress intended to or otherwise
reached felon disenfranchisement through passage of the VRA, two initial inquiries must
be addressed. First, does any constitutional provision act as a per se bar to felon
disenfranchisement? Second, and most relevant, does the Congress possess sufficient
constitutional power to limit state efforts to restrict the political participation of criminal
offenders, if Congress were to so choose?
25
With respect to the first question, it does not appear that under the current
interpretative paradigm any constitutional provision will act as a per se bar.26 Thus, the
majority of this section focuses upon Congress's authority to regulate voting, and
highlights several different Constitutional provisions that either explicitly or implicitly
enable Congressional action.27 Inquiries into Congress's power to regulate elections
typically center upon the enabling provisions contained within the Civil War
Reconstruction Amendments. 28 This approach is sensible, because these amendments
vastly altered the relative balance of the federal bargain by reallocating significant
legislative power in favor of Congressional authority. While the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments are certainly worthy of focus for opponents of felon disenfranchisement,
the section describes how recent decisions have limited the reach of the enabling powers
of both of these amendments.29 Despite the limitations placed on these approaches, this
2S. REP. No. 97-417, at 39 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, at 217.
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (establishing totality of circumstances to be used in determination of a violation
of the VRA).
24 See supra note 15, infra notes 135-39, and accompanying text.
25 See Richard L. Hasen, The Uncertain Congressional Power to Ban State Disenfranchisement Laws, 49
HOWARD L.J. 767 (2006) (addressing this question by raising concern about Congress's regulatory power
in light of the Supreme Court's New Federalism jurisprudence).
26 For an argument to change the interpretative paradigm see Chin, infra notes 88-102 (arguing that the
Fifteenth Amendment properly understood might act as a per se limitation upon felon disenfranchisement).
27 See H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437 (citing Article I, § 4, and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as Constitutional power to regulate voting).28 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
29 See infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
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section also examines an additional vehicle, Article I, Section 4, which has received no
limiting treatment. Bolstered by a series of historical precedents, including Oregon v.
Mitchell,30 United States v. Classic,31 Chief Justice Hughes's unanimous opinion in
Smiley v. Holm, 32 and Ex Parte Yarbrough,33 it is clear Congress possesses unambiguous
power under Article I, Section 4 to enfranchise criminal offenders for the Congressional
portion of the voting ballot.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
1. Section 1 versus Section 2
As noted above, the initial search for constitutional enabling provisions often
leads to the Reconstruction Amendments, adopted immediately following the Civil War.
The proffered goal of these Amendments was to expand civil rights and extend the
franchise to populations formerly denied the vote.34 To further that end, subsequent
judicial interpretation of the amendments permits federal intervention into a substantial
amount of previously untouchable state conduct. Specifically, both the Equal
Protection 35 and Due Process 36 clauses, as well as the enabling provision contained in
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,37 served as vehicles for a significant
redistribution of relative federal and state power. In all, these amendments represented
such a dramatic reformulation that some commentators have called them America's
Second Constitution.
38
Various provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly and implicitly relate
to voting. The Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process clauses tacitly include
voting, while Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains the most direct reference.
Section 2 provides: "[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in anyway
abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis for representation
therein shall be reduced ... .
The debate in felon disenfranchisement jurisprudence begins with the words "or
other crime." This language may implicitly support the right of the states to engage in
disenfranchisement. Yet, the historical and jurisprudential record that supports this
language argues the provision contains some latent ambiguity. For example, does this
30 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
31 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
32 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
31 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
34 See generally, Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981 (2002); Wayne D. Moore, The Fourteenth
Amendment's Initial Authority: Problems of Constitutional Coherence, 13 TEMPLE POL & Civ.RTs. L. REV.
515 (2004); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American Freedom 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZA
L. REV. 2153 (1996).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36 Id.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
38 See generally, GEORGE FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2003); ERIC FORNER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877
(1988).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
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specific language in Section 2 preempt the general concepts of Equal Protection and Due
Process as required in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment? Furthermore, does the
specificity of this language in the Amendment somehow limit the reach of Section 5?
After all, Section 5 provides Congress with general authority to enforce the provisions of
the balance of the Amendment. However, given the "or other crime" language, may
Congress adopt a statute designed to preempt the very act that Section 2 appears to
authorize? While some of these questions remain unclear, others received judicial gloss
from the Court's decision in Richardson v. Ramirez.
40
In Richardson, the Court considered whether the Equal Protection Clause
contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment served as any limitation on the
state's power to disenfranchise offenders. Section 1 states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.41
On its face, the Equal Protection Clause appears to preclude disenfranchisement of
criminal offenders. Felons have a strong liberty interest in voting; the statutes in question
treat persons unequally by allowing some people the right to vote while denying others
that right. Therefore, although the Constitution did not initially contemplate this form of
federal involvement in voting, the plaintiffs in Richardson argued the Reconstruction
Amendments modified the relative balance of state and federal power so as to permit this
very form of intervention.
The Richardson Court disagreed, instead reading Section 1 together with the
language contained in Section 2. In other words, the Court considered the Equal
Protection Clause in the context of the "or other crime" clause, and argued the framers of
the Amendment could not have intended to prohibit voting disenfranchisement when
another section authorizes it with only a lesser sanction of reduced representation. 42 To
hold otherwise, argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, would leave Section 2 an empty vehicle,
thus violating the general axiom of reading Constitutional provisions in such a manner as
to provide each with operative meaning.
43
To further solidify its view, the Court reviewed the legislative history to
determine whether a deviation from the standard interpretative rule was justified.
Rehnquist found that although it was scant, nothing in the record countered his initial
reading of the text.44 Additionally, he considered state practice in the era during the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and found wide use of disenfranchisement at the
time of the Amendment. 45 Finally, the opinion looked to other Reconstruction Era
legislation to interpret the interaction between these constitutional sections. It reviewed
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
42 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 42-43, 55.
43 Id. at 55.
4Id. at 41-52.45
1 d. at 48.
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the Reconstruction Act of 1867, an act adopted by virtually the same Congress that
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 The Court found its language strongly favored the
continued permissibility of state disenfranchisement schemes. The 1867 statute
mandated that states adopt constitutional provisions to prevent definitional manipulation
of felonies.48  Essentially, Congress did not want state legislatures prospectively to
disenfranchise minority populations, so it conditioned reentry into the Union upon a
variety of measures. These included adopting provisions which limited criminal
disenfranchisement to the definitions of crimes at common law.
49
For Justice Rehnquist, the 1867 Act clearly implied that states retained a general
power to disenfranchise following the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments.
50
Specifically, to require states to limit disenfranchisement to the common law felonies
meant those states still possessed the Constitutional power to disenfranchise. Taken
together, the Richardson Court held the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment failed to reach felon disenfranchisement.
5'
Twelve years after Richardson, the Court returned to the topic of felon
disenfranchisement and thereby complicated its previously clear pronouncement
regarding the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hunter v Underwood,2
Justice Rehnquist authored his second majority opinion on the topic, this time choosing to
craft a limiting exception to the blanket rule previously pronounced in Richardson.
At issue in Hunter was Section 182 of the 1901 Alabama Constitution, 53 a section
which disenfranchised those convicted of a variety of crimes including "any crime
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. 5 4  The constitutional provision
contained an unusual list of enumerated crimes. For example, the list included several
misdemeanors 55 while failing to capture more serious crimes such as second-degree
56manslaughter. Furthermore, it captured those convicted of "any ... crime involving
moral turpitude." 57 The term "moral turpitude" was left undefined; however, subsequent
cases in the Alabama courts provided a broad construction.
58
The Hunter Court reviewed the post-Richardson Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, including such notable cases as Washington v. Davis59 and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.60 Those decisions
46 
Id. at 49.
47
1d. at 54.
41 Id. at 51-52.
491d. at 52.50 Id. at 49-53.
"1 Id. at 56.
52 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
53 See id. at 224 (discussing ALA. CONST. Art. VIII, § 182 (1901)). Section 182 has subsequently been
repealed but recreated as ALA CONST. Art. VIII, § 177 (1996), which works to disenfranchise one convicted
of "felonies involving moral turpitude."
54 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 224.
" Id. at 226.561d. at 227.
57 Id.
58 E.g., Pippin v. State, 197 Ala. 613, 616 (1916) (holding that selling cocaine is not mala prohibita and,
therefore, not a crime of moral turpitude).
'9 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
60 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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require litigants to show either a state statute constitutes an outright racial classification
or that state action creates disproportionate impacts and is motivated by a discriminatory
intent.
61
Initially, the Supreme Court had to determine whether this evolution in Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence was applicable to the inquiry in question. In Richardson,
Justice Rehnquist previously determined felon disenfranchisement was entirely outside
the domain of the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 He had ruled the "or other crime" language
of Section 2 meant the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to felon
disenfranchisement. However, while the Hunter Court could have ended its argument
there, Rehnquist changed course by co-opting the standard presented through Arlington
Heights and Washington v. Davis. Thus, Rehnquist negated his prior language in
Richardson which stated the "or other crime" language of Section 2 preempted any
application of equal protection; 63 rather, he claimed the Equal Protection Clause applied
to disenfranchisement. Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist stated "we are confident that
Section 2 was not designed to permit purposeful racial discrimination ... nothing in our
opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez suggests to the contrary."
64
With this new understanding in place, the Court turned to the record in Hunter.
The Court quickly found that the statute did not reflect a racial classification, yet, when
considering the nature of the historical record, the Court still determined the statute to be
unconstitutional.65 Specifically, the record of the Alabama Constitutional Convention
contained direct evidence of intentional racial animus in the enactment of Section 182,
and on these grounds the Court found the provision to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 6
Following Hunter, the issue of felon disenfranchisement returned to the State of
Alabama through a de facto "legislative remand., 67 In response, Alabama re-enacted a
wide-reaching, facially neutral, disenfranchisement provision with a new legislative
history that contained no evidence of racial animus. Thus, the statute was subsequently
immunized from further Fourteenth Amendment review under the post-Hunter standard.
Without doubt, the Hunter intent standard is difficult to reach. Even if this
exacting standard is met, a litigant may find only a de minimis change in the substantive
law should a current legislature select to reinstate similar legislation merely lacking the
record of racial animus. With only cosmetic changes and a new legislative history, post-
Hunter courts have little choice but to deem such a statute both facially neutral and
without a discriminatory intent. Therefore, for opponents of felon disenfranchisement
seeking to make lasting change via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause appears to be unhelpful.
61 Id. at 255, 256; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
62 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
63 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
64 d.
65 Id. at 227.
66Id. at 231.
67 See generally, Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 (1991);
Nash E. Long, The "Constitutional Remand": Judicial Review of Constitutionally Dubious Statutes, 14 J.L.
& POL. 667 (1998).
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2. Use of the Enabling Provision of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Neither Richardson nor Hunter directly addresses the limitations Congress would
face in implementing statutory standards for criminal disenfranchisement. They merely
address whether the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause is a per se bar to
felon disenfranchisement. The Court provided a negative answer in Richardson because
of the specificity of the language in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Court's desire to provide each constitutional provision with some operational meaning.
Nevertheless, the remaining and most difficult question raised by Richardson and its
progeny for utilizing the VRA is whether this specificity in Section 2 also prevents
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment from reaching felon disenfranchisement.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "[t]he Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."68  The
Richardson holding suggests Congress could not use its Section 5 power with
disenfranchisement schemes. However, Hunter supports a contrary view. It places a
caveat to Richardson's general reading and holds state disenfranchisement statutes
enacted for a discriminatory purpose are invalid. Thus, it is possible that Congressional
legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 and aimed at regulating discriminatory purposes
would be constitutionally valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless,
Congress's use of the Section 5 power to regulate felon disenfranchisement is potentially
subject to other notable hurdles. Specifically, the Supreme Court's City of Boerne v.
Flores6 9 decision significantly curtails the scope of Congress's Section 5 power.70
City of Boerne involved a challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), a statute passed pursuant to Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 71 Justice Kennedy, for the Court, found RFRA to be a wide-sweeping act
72that potentially included regulating conduct which was inherently constitutional. This
was not unprecedented as the Court had a history of sustaining "[1]egislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violation ... even if in the process it prohibits conduct which
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
69 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
70 The proper reach of the Congress's power in the post-City of Boerne world was recently confronted in
debate over the reauthorization of Section 5 of the VRA. For notable commentary on the subject, see
Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44
Hous. L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing Boerne is inapplicable to reauthorized Section 5 of the VRA because it
fundamentally differs from statutes invalidated through the Court's Boerne jurisprudence); but see Ellen D.
Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Pre-Clearance: A Response to Professor Karlan, 44 HOUS. L. REV.
33 (2007) (arguing the "City of Boerne standard of review remains applicable to reauthorization .... but
that application of this standard must be adjusted to reflect the status of section 5 as an operational
statute."); Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007) (asserting the Elections Clause provides an alternative basis through which
Section 5 re-authorization might be sustained).
71 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507-516. In Boerne, a local church sought a building permit to expand its
size, which required pre-approval by the City's Historic Landmark Commission. The changes were not
been pre-approved, and the construction permit was denied. The church challenged the denial decision
under the RFRA. Id.
72 Id. at 532. Justice Kennedy noted RFRA was a direct Congressional response to the Court's previous
opinion in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), acting
directly to overrule Smith. Kennedy was troubled by the noted intent of Congress deliberately to overrule
Smith. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-516.
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is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of authority previously
reserved to the states."' 73  However, Justice Kennedy emphasized "as broad as the
Congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited. 74 The Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 5 power is designed to be "remedial. 75 In order to be remedial, there must be
congruence and proportionality between the injury and the means adopted to prevent such
harm.
76
Justice Kennedy argued the RFRA failed this congruence and proportionality
standard. In reviewing the legislative findings, he noted how the record contained a lack
of recent examples of discrimination,7 7 suggesting the harm in question was minor. At
the same time, he characterized the Congressional response as legislation with a
nationwide scope ensuring its "intrusion at every level of government., 78 Because the
RFRA imposed substantial costs to federalism and did so to prevent only a speculative
and unsubstantiated harm, the statute was invalidated.
The invalidation of the RFRA casts doubt upon Congress's enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 Regardless, following Boerne, it still
may be possible for Congress to adopt a voting statute consistent with the congruence and
proportionality standard.80 Namely, since a statute aimed at voting regulations is more
discrete than the vast reach of the RFRA, the Court may deem a franchise related statute
to have a greater degree of congruence and proportionality. At the same time, the Court
may find Congress cannot use Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to craft a statute
aimed at preventing felon disenfranchisement. Nevertheless, this would not end the
inquiry as Congress enjoys multiple enabling powers within the voting domain, including
authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 4.
B. The Fifteenth Amendment
1. A Unitary Reading?
The Fourteenth Amendment is not the only Reconstruction Amendment that
concerns voting. In fact, the Fifteenth Amendment actually contains the most specific
language on the topic. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states: "[t]he right of the
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied ... on account of race ... ,
" Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
74 Id. at 518-19 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970)).
I d. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
7 Id. at 520.
77 See id. at 530 (finding no cited episodes of religious bigotry in forty years).
71 Id. at 532.
79 For the discussion of these limitations in the recent VRA § 5 reauthorization, see Karlan, Section Five
Squared, supra note 70; Katz supra note 70.
80 See Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 16 (describing why the VRA might not
meet the same fate as RFRA); see also Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Pre-Clearance, supra note
70, at 52-63 (arguing for an approach whereby long existing statutes such as Section 5 of the VRA could be
analyzed under a modified version the Boerne standard); Ellen Katz, Reinforcing Representation:
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite
Courts, 101 MICH. L.REv. 2341, 2388 (2003) (explaining a degree of targeted federal intrusion into state
and local affairs might be justified when it helps ensure that sub-national electoral markets operate
effectively).
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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The core question presented in an analysis under the Fifteenth Amendment is if a
petitioner need only demonstrate a state has unconstitutionally denied or abridged the
right to vote. On its face, the Fifteenth Amendment concerns itself not with intent or
design of a governmental action, but rather with the result of such governmental action.
As applied to criminal disenfranchisement, the wide construction afforded Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Richardson leaves open the question of whether that
section acted to remove criminal disenfranchisement from not only the balance of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also from the other Reconstruction Amendments. In other
words, in construing the Fifteenth Amendment, it is unclear whether it is proper to afford
all three post-Civil War Amendments a unitary reading such that the "or other crime"
language of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment influences the meaning of the
subsequent Reconstruction Amendment.
In the few available cases, a unitary construction has received at least some
implicit support. For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden,82 the Court essentially
interpreted the scope of the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments as co-extensive. 83 Specifically, regarding the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Court crafted a requirement that intent to discriminate be demonstrated. 84  This
requirement is identical to the standard the Court previously adopted in Fourteenth
Amendment cases such as Washington v. Davis85 and Arlington Heights,8 6 and later
adopted in Hunter.87 While subsequent congressional actions have brought other parts of
the City of Mobile holding into serious question, 88 City of Mobile's coextensive treatment
is not the only basis supporting a unitary reading of the Reconstruction Amendments;
rather, a unitary reading is arguably supported by the history of the Reconstruction
Amendments. As virtually the same Congress adopted each of the Reconstruction
Amendments, the inference may be drawn that Amendments should be read together by
their plain text in the absence of a specific textual removal by a subsequent amendment.
Specifically, supporters of disenfranchisement would argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment's explicit recognition of state power to disenfranchise should continue to
operate irrespective of the language of the subsequent Fifteenth Amendment.
Additionally, the unitary reading theory argues that not only the language of the Fifteenth
Amendment but also its enforcement provision 89 can reach no further than the
aforementioned and now potentially limited post-Boerne Fourteenth Amendment.
2. An Alternative Construction?
82 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
8 See id. at 65-66 (treating Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as co-extensive); but see Chin, infra
notes 90-101 (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment was not co-extensive, but rather amended the
Fourteenth Amendment).
84 City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 65.
85 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
86 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
87 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
88 The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act eliminated the intent standard and substituted an effects
test. S. Rep. 97-417, 15-17, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192-94 (1982).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
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Professor Gabriel Chin offers a contrasting construction of the Reconstruction
Amendments,9" one that might allow the enabling provision of the Fifteenth Amendment
to reach further than its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart. In passing the Fifteenth
Amendment, he argues its framers intended to alter Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9' This idea is derived from the theory of statutory interpretation of leges
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant-"last in time controls"92 -which, in general
terms, asserts that more recent amendments to the Constitution invariably must alter
previous amendments. This theory of statutory construction is based on the notion that
otherwise, earlier inconsistent provisions would nullify the amendment, or at least create
inconsistent results. Under this theory, when the framers crafted the Fifteenth
Amendment, they also intended to amend the partial remedy contained in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment in favor of the more complete remedy offered in the later
amendment.
93
This approach certainly is persuasive; however, it is not without its own
interpretive difficulties. One resultant problem resides in the fact that the drafters of the
Fifteenth Amendment failed to include an explicit repeal clause, as featured in other
portions of the Constitution. This creates ambiguity with regards to the "later in time"
construction, and thus forces one to argue that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
voided implicitly, rather than by explicit Constitutional statement.94  A stringent
presumption generally stands against implied repeal, but such a reading prevails when the
new provision clearly acts as a substitute.95 Professor Chin seeks to satisfy this exacting
standard by arguing that the dissimilarity in remedies offered by the two amendments
makes them incompatible. 96 Namely, Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides a
greater remedy than Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as "there is no circumstance
in which the remedy of Section 2 can be applied instead of the remedy of the Fifteenth
Amendment." 97 Effectively, the Fifteenth Amendment completely occupies the remedial
field which it shares with the Fourteenth Amendment, leading to the conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment remedy must have been repealed by implication.
98
In addition to the structural theory, Professor Chin offers additional evidence,
arguing that the continuity argument advanced by proponents of unitary construction is
not dispositive. He notes it is the very same set of framers who failed to include an
explicit repeal of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment that also specifically failed to
repeal other portions of the Constitution-most notably the infamous three-fifths
compromise.99 Given that Congress failed to include this important explicit repeal, it is
9) Chin, supra note 10.
91 Chin, supra note 10, at 272-75.
92 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 899 (6th ed. 1990).
93 Chin, supra note 10, at 275-78.
94 Id.
9' Id. at 275, fli. 92.
96 Id. at 278-80.
9' Id. at 278.
9' Id. at 277-78.
99 See id. at 266-69 (noting that despite the Reconstruction Era Congress's obvious intent to terminate
slavery and its appendages, the Thirteenth Amendment neglected explicitly to repeal the controversial
three-fifths compromise).
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conceivable that the Reconstruction Congress sought to repeal Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment but correspondingly failed to elucidate an explicit repeal.
A review of legislative history supports this possibility. Professor Chin quotes
several Reconstruction Amendment framers who argued that the failure of the "carrot and
stick" approach of the Fourteenth Amendment necessitated the outright "stick" contained
in the Fifteenth Amendment.100 Their views are supported by a variety of prominent
nineteenth century legal scholars such as Justice Story, Thomas Cooley and Edward
Corwin, all of whom raise the possibility of implicit repeal.10 1
While no court has embraced this alternative construction of the Fifteenth
Amendment, it nonetheless presents an approach worthy of further judicial inquiry. In
the meantime, however, given Congress's authority under the enabling provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment appears co-extensive with that of the now limited post-City of
Boerne Fourteenth Amendment, opponents of felon disenfranchisement seeking to find a
clear constitutional mechanism by which to further their cause might be better suited to
look elsewhere within the Constitution.
C. Congress's Article I, Section 4 Authority-A Forgotten Power?
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement should remember Congress possesses
constitutional authority to effect voting regulations pursuant to Article I, Section 4:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations .... 102
On its face, this provision allows Congress to displace state voting regulations which
effect the time, place or manner of holding Congressional elections. This ability to "alter
such Regulations" concerning time, place and manner may appear to fall outside of the
domain of felon disenfranchisement; however, a significant line of jurisprudence argues
otherwise. For example, following Justice Black's interpretation of Article I, Section 4
from Oregon v. Mitchell'03-an interpretation bolstered by a variety of historical
precedents'04-suggests Congress has sufficient constitutional authority to invalidate
existing state voting regulations and enfranchise offenders for the Congressional portion
of the election ballot.
In Mitchell, the Court addressed whether Congress possessed the constitutional
authority to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 for both federal and state elections." 5
Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall held that Congress could lower
'00 Id. at 272.
'01 Id. at 272-76.
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, §4. (emphasis added).
'0' 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The substantive holding of Mitchell was overruled by the Twenty Sixth
Amendment. However, the structural holding regarding the reach of the Article I, Section 4 power remains
unaffected by the subsequent constitutional provision.
104 See generally United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Ex
Parte Yarbrough, 1 10 U.S. 651 (1884).
"'5 See generally Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112.
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the voting age for national elections.10 6 However, Justice Black simultaneously joined
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun to create a different five-
member majority prohibiting federal authorities from lowering the voting age for the state
portion of the election ballot. 10 7 While other Justices were not in complete agreement
regarding his rationale, Justice Black's opinion became of critical importance as his vote
acted as the ever-important fifth vote twice, creating the unique situation of a decision
with two majority opinions.
10 8
In his Mitchell opinion, Justice Black explained how Article I, Section 4 reflected
a compromise at the Constitutional Convention; while some framers favored exclusive
authority of the states over all aspects of elections, "those who favored national authority
over national elections prevailed."' 09  Several delegates, among them Henry Cabot,
appearing at the constitutional ratifying conventions, argued that if state legislatures were
to control national elections, they would have the ability to "annihilate" the authority of
the federal government. 11 While agreeing that unfettered state authority would empower
state legislatures to effect federal elections, Theophilus Parsons indicated greater fears
about the proposed state-regulated elections, asserting that states could "even disqualify
[as many as] one third of the electors." 11  Parsons thus feared that without the federal
power reserved to control federal elections, "the people [would] have no remedy" against
states' activity in that area; these fears were quelled as "the 4 th section [Article I, Section
4] provide[d] a remedy" by granting Congressional power to regulate in the election
process. 112
The most prominent speaker on the topic for federal power in elections was James
Madison. Madison highlighted the concern raised by state control of federal elections
that a lack of uniformity in the election process might be problematic: "It was thought
that the regulation of time, place, and manner, of electing the representatives, should be
uniform throughout the continent. Some States might regulate the elections on the
principles of equality, and others might regulate them otherwise. This diversity would be
'06ld. at 117-18.
1
0 7 
id.
108 As described later, a host of cases cited by Justice Black, as well as others not referenced in his opinion,
provide ample support for his position. Justice Black's opinion contains significant historical insight into
the Elections clause. See also William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreword to HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, MR.
JUSTICE BLACK AND MRS. BLACK, THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK (1986) ("The
place of Hugo Lafayette Black in the pantheon of great Justices of the Supreme Court grows more and
more secure with each passing year. His fiercely asserted constitutional views ... reflected his awe for the
scheme of government devised by the Framers, and the intense patriotism and unbounded faith in his
country that highlighted his every performance in public office.") As reflected in his dissenting opinion in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1948) (Black, J. dissenting), Justice Black believed the Fourteenth
Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Though the position failed to carry the
majority of the Court, by the 1960s, virtually all individual rights protected by the first eight amendments
had been applied against the states. See Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black
and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA L. REv. 1221, 1234-35 (2002).
... Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 at fri. 2.
110Id.
i11 Id.
112 id
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obviously unjust." '113 Justice Black's citation to Madison stood as a direct rebuke to
Justice Harlan who cited alternative language from Madison to support his dissent.
114
Concerns were raised by other members of the Court regarding whether this area
of election regulation was controlled by Article I, Section 2, which provides, in relevant
part: "[T]he electors in each state shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of
the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."" 5  Although this could be
interpreted to imply that states possess exclusive authority over all electoral
qualifications, Justice Black disagreed. He argued that the framers designed a shared
arrangement whereby Article I, Section 2 would be read simultaneously with Article I,
Section 4 and the Necessary and Proper Clause,"16 thus permitting state regulations over
Congressional elections only to the extent Congress failed to take contrary action.
Justice Black found ample support for his expansive and integrated reading of
Article 1, Section 4 not only from its framers, but also from several notable Supreme
Court decisions; a careful reading of jurisprudential history demonstrates that Black's
construction, although often overlooked,, is completely supportable. For example, his
opinion cites United States v. Classic,' 17 in which Justice Stone argued that the states'
ability to set qualifications pursuant to Article I, Section 2 operated only to the extent
Congress had not restricted such action under either Article I, Section 4 or the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Justice Stone's interpretation may appear odd initially, as it all but
reads the qualifications clause out of the constitution. For this reason, it is important
simultaneously to consider Smiley v. Holm 1 8a case cited by both Justices Black and
Stone-where Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
[T]hese comprehensive words [of Article I, Section 4] embrace authority to
provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to the
times and places but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of
voting, protection of voters, duties of inspectors and canvassers and the
making and publication of election retums .... 119
This language from the Smiley opinion certainly bolsters the views of both Stone and
Black.
The Court's reading in Classic and Smiley is further supported by Reconstruction
Era cases such as Ex Parte Siebold,120 Ex Parte Clarke
12 1 and Ex Parte Yarbrough.122
113 Id. at fn. 5 (citing 3 J. ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 367 (1876)).
114Id. at 210-11.
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
116 "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States ......
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
117 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
1' 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
"9 Id. at 366. (emphasis added); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001) (quoting of Smiley
v. Holm language by the Rehnquist Court); Karlan, Section 5 Squared, supra note 70, at fn. 77 (listing
additional practices that the Supreme Court has found to fall within the range of Congress's Election
Clause power).
120 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
121 100 U.S. 399 (1879).
122 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
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Among these cases, the latter may be the most significant. 123  In Yarbrough, Justice
Samuel Miller, often maligned for his decision in the Slaughter House Cases, 124 found
clear federal authority to prevent private violence against individuals attempting to
exercise their federal franchise.125 The Yarbrough opinion represented a break from prior
Reconstruction era cases, such as United States v. Harris, 126 where the Court "held that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments reached state action, not private violence."'
2 7
For Justice Miller in Yarbrough, the critical distinction became Congress's invocation of
Article I Section 4.128 He fused this provision together with the Fifteenth Amendment "to
permit strong national protection of the electoral process." 129
Time and time again, the Court has found Article I, Section 4 allows the Congress
to do what other constitutional provisions cannot. It is this long line of jurisprudence that
fueled Justice Black's position in Mitchell. By relying on these aforementioned cases and
with respect to the question of voting by eighteen year olds, Black secured his fragile
coalition. However, even jettisoning Mitchell, the available jurisprudence clearly
supports two positions: states may regulate their own voting qualifications, but the
federal legislature can insist on federal qualifications for Congressional elections.
30
It is with this understanding of Congress's available powers that this article
addresses whether the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982 reaches felon
disenfranchisement. As described herein, because current interpretations of the
Reconstruction enabling provisions do not provide an unambiguous legal foundation for
the federal government to regulate felon disenfranchisement, Article I, Section 4 is
critical. While Article 1, Section 4 might not assist in the restoration of the purely state
123 Id. For an intriguing discussion of these cases and era, see RICHARD VALELLY, THE Two
RECONSTRUCTIONS (2004) 68-71, 243-250, 245 ("[I]n these rulings, a majority of the Court adopted a
nationalist reading of article I, section 4. The Court literally took the view that nothing prevented Congress
from regulating federal elections in any way it chose."); Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of
Blacks?: The Supreme Court and Reconstruction, Reconsidered, 41 L. & Soc'Y REv. (forthcoming 2007)
(arguing the common narrative of the Supreme Court's abandonment of the freeman is a( odds with both
the jurisprudential and historical record).
124 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
125 See Yarbrough, I 10 U.S. at 660-62 ( Responding to notion that Congress lacked such authority to act,
Justice Miller noted "[I]t is only because the [C]ongress of the United States, through long habit and long
years of forbearance has, in deference and respect to the states, refrained from the exercise of these powers
that they are now doubted.").
126 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
127 See VALELLY, supra note 123, at 244.
128 Id. at 245.
29 Id. at 246.
130 Professor Karlan notes "[T]he Supreme Court's recent decisions under the Elections Clause have
confirmed the longstanding interpretation of the clause as a grant of essentially plenary authority." See
Karlan Section 5 Squared, supra note 70, at 16. Professor Karlan cites a number of cases, including Cook,
531 U.S. at 523-24, and Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67,69 (1997) (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 832-33 (1995)). Professor Katz, while otherwise challenging Professor Karlan, appears to agree
to Congress's plenary Elections Clause authority in so much as it concerns Congressional elections. See
Katz, supra note 70, at 46 (noting "[P]rofessor Karlan reads this precedent as establishing that Article I
grants Congress 'essentially plenary authority' when it regulates Congressional elections and that may well
be right.") (citations omitted).
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portion of the ballot,' 3' this constitutional provision provides ample authority for the
federal regulation of Congressional elections, 32 thus ensuring Congress the ability to
reach-and in some instances eliminate-the practice of disenfranchisement.
III. REVIVING A VRA DRIVEN FELON FRANCHISE RESTORATION STRATEGY
As discussed above, while the extent of Congress's enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments is the subject of serious debate, Congress's Article I,
Section 4 power is far less ambiguous. Even ignoring Mitchell and focusing on other
cases, it is clear that Congress may displace all state-level time, place or manner
regulations imposed upon Congressional elections, including felon disenfranchisement.
The language of Article I, Section 4, however, demonstrates that actual congressional
action in favor of this end is required; nevertheless, the framers of the 1982 Amendments
cited Article I, Section 4 as a basis for the statute's authority. 133 Thus, with the inclusion
of Article I, Section 4 as a partial authority supporting the 1982 amendments to the VRA,
a core question becomes whether Congress intended, or otherwise allowed, the VRA to
regulate felon disenfranchisement.
So far, not a single court has considered this narrow Article I, Section 4 based
question. Further, the Supreme Court has uniformly refused to consider any VRA-driven
felon franchise restoration claim. However, several leading cases in the Circuit Courts
have reviewed the more general VRA-based restoration question. Although centering
upon different rationales, not a single VRA-led restoration case has survived appellate
review. Instead, several arguments have undermined current VRA-led litigation.
131 It is worth noting that in the context of mixed elections (i.e. simultaneous state and federal elections)
Article I, Section 4 might allow the Congress to reach disenfranchisement from state elections through the
VRA. However, as applied to felon disenfranchisement, this direct question will be left for future research.
132 See generally, Jeffrey Rosen, Divided Suffrage, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL
TRAGEDIES (William N. Eskridge & Sanford Levinson eds., 1999); Robert Alexander Schwartz, The Nature
of Consent in the American Republic: Substance or Procedure? The Elections Clause and Single-Member
Congressional Districts, 38 U. S. F. L. REV. 467, 470-76 (2004); Francine Miller, Note, Fairness in the
Election Arena: Congressional Regulation of Federal Ballot Access, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 923-34
(1987).
133 See H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2462 (indicating
Congressional power to affect even local elections to prevent intimidation and corrupt influences).
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On the one hand, the Second Circuit 134 and Eleventh Circuit135 invoke a default
presumption, called the plain statement rule, arguing that there is a lack of evidence in the
record confirming Congress's intent to allow the VRA to reach and restrict the practice of
felon disenfranchisement. The Sixth Circuit 136 and Ninth Circuit, 37 perhaps implicitly
concerned about the VRA's reach, apply the VRA to felon disenfranchisement, but have
still found the disenfranchisement statute in question to survive the totality of the
circumstances test. Notwithstanding these pitfalls, of supreme importance is that none of
these VRA-based cases consider-let alone refute-the notion that the VRA's citation to
Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution operates to allow Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to regulate state restrictions involving the Congressional portion of the
election ballot.
A. Merging the Outlooks of VRA Felon Disenfranchisement Cases
A threshold question confronted by reviewing courts is whether Congress
intended to, or otherwise allowed, the VRA to reach disenfranchisement statutes when it
amended the VRA in 1982. The VRA and its legislative history are silent, neither
134 See Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir.1996) (en banc) (holding Section 2 of the VRA should not be
construed to include felon disenfranchisement because the VRA lacks a clear statement of Congressional
intent to raise a constitutional challenge, or to disturb the typical balance of state and federal power.
Precedential value of this case was weakened by split of en banc Circuit); but see Hayden v. Pataki, 449
F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that VRA should not encompass prisoner disenfranchisement because
Congress made no clear or plain statement of such intent).
135 The Court in Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d. 1214 (1 1 h Cit. 2004) (en banc) cert. denied sub
nom. Johnson v. Bush, 126 S.Ct. 650 (2005), invokes the plain statement doctrine to dismiss plaintiffs'
evidence of racial discrimination via felon disenfranchisement because Congress had not made a plain
statement of intent to create a constitutional challenge through Section 2 of the VRA. The court noted
concern regarding the boundaries of the VRA resulting from City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
The Court argued findings within the record accompanying the 1982 Amendments to the VRA as cursory
and "without a record of constitutional violations, applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to Florida's
felon disenfranchisement law would force us to address whether Congress exceeded its enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment." Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231. Given the lack of a
plain statement in the congressional record, as well as Congress's tacit authorization of states to purge
felons from the voter rolls through the 1993 Motor Voter Act, the Johnson Court, much like their Second
Circuit counterparts, was unwilling to engage in the VRA analysis.
136See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying the VRA, the Court held that a balance
of factors listed in the VRA Senate Report supported upholding a felon disenfranchisement statute despite
claims the statute violated Section 2 of the VRA).
137 In Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F.Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wash. 1997), the court found allegations of vote denial
and dilution under Section 2 of the VRA due to a felon disenfranchisement statute inadequate to dismiss,
but the court left open the possibility of a violation of the VRA for vote denial based on the VRA's results
test. The District Court found the "plain statement rule" not to apply to the VRA. Id., at 1308-09. Though
the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's finding that a vote denial claim can be brought based
upon felon disenfranchisement under the VRA, the Court criticized the lower court for its misapplication of
the totality of the circumstances test. Farrakhan v. Locke, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the
Court stated that evidence of racial bias within the criminal justice system can be considered to support a
vote denial claim. Id. at 1016. Much like the Wesley Court, supra note 136, the District Court, on remand,
granted summary judgment after determining that, despite sufficient evidence of racial discrimination
hindering the ability of minorities to be active in the political process, there was insufficient proof the felon
disenfranchisement statute resulted in racial discrimination in the electoral process. Farrakhan v. Gregoire,
2006 WL 1889273, *1 (E.D. Wash. July 7, 2006).
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favoring nor disfavoring inclusion, thus forcing some courts to review subsequent
Congressional action for insight. 138 These courts have found language tacitly supporting
disenfranchisement; however, there is no direct indication whether the 1982 Congress
intended the VRA to apply to felon disenfranchisement.
139
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments indicates that Congress responded
to the Supreme Court's restrictive decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden by crafting a
wide-reaching, flexible, and fact-intensive standard designed to reach a significant
amount of state conduct. 40  Section 2 of the VRA contemplates substantial judicial
involvement, allowing individuals whose voting rights are denied or abridged to seek
redress.
Despite the expansive reach of Section 2, some circuit courts apply the plain
statement rule and thus hold the VRA inapplicable to felon disenfranchisement.1 4 The
plain statement rule is a default presumption, which, if applied, requires Congress to state
clearly its intention to create a constitutional challenge' 4 2 or to disturb the relative
balance between state and federal power. 143 These courts argue that with respect to felon
disenfranchisement, the VRA lacks such a plain statement, and, thus, neither engage in
the totality of the circumstances analysis as set forth in the VRA, nor do they allow for
the presentation of any evidence.
144
Commentators have criticized courts for applying this default presumption
without conducting a further analysis. While such a frontal critique may ultimately prove
successful, all commentators and courts have ignored the most specific analytical
problem with the court's invocation of the plain statement rule. Specifically, plaintiffs in
each of the major VRA cases sought total restoration of their voting rights. In other
words, they sought access to both federal and state level electoral contests. While both
131 See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 322 ("Subsequent Congressional actions provide additional evidence that
Congress has not understood the Voting Rights Act to cover felon disenfranchisement laws. For example,
the National Voter Registration Act, enacted in 1993, explicitly provides for 'criminal conviction' as a
basis upon which voters' names may be removed from lists of eligible voters. The Help America Vote Act
of 2002 directs States to remove disenfranchised felons from their lists of those eligible to vote in federal
elections.") (citations omitted).
139 Several scholars applying the work of Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow argue legislative intent is
ultimately indeterminate. See generally, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They" Not an "It":
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INTL. REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); but see Arthur Lupia & Mathew D.
McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585 (2005) (arguing that outputs of social choice models do not prove that
legislative intent is irrelevant). For Arrow's General Possibility Theorem,see KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d Ed. 1963).
140 See generally, S. REP. No. 97-417, at 39 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 204-05.
141 See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 305 (finding of no clear statement by the Second Circuit); Johnson, 405 F.3d at
1214 (dismissing claim because of lack of Congressional clear statement).
142 See DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (requiring Congress
to state plainly its decision to create a constitutional challenge; without such a plain statement, courts
should construe a statute to avoid such a direct constitutional challenge).
143 See Gregory v. Ashcrofl, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (congressional interference with Missouri's decision
to establish a qualification for their judges would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state
powers; the court will not assume such an intent unless Congress makes its intention to so disturb
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute).
144 Id.
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federal and state elections appear on the same ballot, the Constitutional framework
surrounding these electoral contests significantly differs.
A VRA claim purely aimed at a Congressional franchise restoration is
qualitatively distinct from a claim for complete ballot restoration. In justifying the
passage of the VRA, Congress invoked the Reconstruction Amendments, 145 but it also
cited another authority, Article I, Section 4.146 This citation is critical for, as the
unanimous decision in Smiley v. Holm provides, Article I, Section 4 allows Congress the
authority to craft "a complete code for Congressional elections."' 147 The provision grants
Congress specific power to pass legislation regulating the Congressional ballot, and
therefore the plain statement rule is simply inapplicable to this piece of the inquiry.
Specifically, with respect to an original power of Congress, there is neither any issue
about disturbing the balance of state and federal power, nor is a constitutional challenge
created. Legislation neither inherently upsets the state and federal balance of power nor
creates a constitutional challenge where Congress's authority is clear.
This point was recently emphasized by Justice Scalia in the otherwise unrelated
case of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey. 148 At issue in Yeskey was
whether Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) covered inmates in state
prisons. Justice Scalia, for the Court, quoted Gregory: "[A]bsent an 'unmistakably clear'
expression of intent to 'alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,' we will interpret a statute to preserve rather than destroy the
States' 'substantial sovereign powers." ' 14 9 Regardless, this language in Gregory did not
alter Justice Scalia's application of the federal statute to state prisoners.
Understanding the impact of Gregory on the reach of the VRA starts with the
phrase "States' substantial sovereign powers."' 150  Sovereign implies supreme in rank.
Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution states, "Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations [of Congressional elections]. . . ,,15, This
language taken together with the host of historical precedents discussed herein argues that
in the area of Congressional elections, Congress is supreme and cannot be deemed to
have imposed its power improperly upon the states when such authority was
constitutionally granted to the federal legislature.
Furthermore, the argument may be presented that in passing the VRA, Congress
never directly considered felon disenfranchisement, and therefore its reach is the mere
by-product of the statute's broad language. However, in Yeskey, Justice Scalia addressed
a similar issue involving the ADA:
[Assuming as true] that Congress did not "envisio[n] that the ADA would
be applied to state prisoners" . . . in the context of an unambiguous
statutory text that is irrelevant. As we have said before, the fact that the
14S See S. REP. 97-417, at 27-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 205-209 (directly implicating a
challenge to state regulation of voting rights).
1
4 6 Id., at 39.
:47 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
"s 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
149 Id., at 208-09 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
ISo Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-461.
151 U.S. CONST. art. I § 4, cl 1.
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statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth. 
152
In the VRA context, Congress's failure specifically to foresee the disenfranchisement
question should be irrelevant. The primary issue is whether the text of the statute is
unambiguously broad enough to include disenfranchisement, and courts should not
employ techniques to render plain language ambiguous. Justice Scalia cautioned, "[t]hat
doctrine [of the plain statement rule] enters in only 'where a statute is susceptible of two
constructions .... "',153 He later added, "[b]ecause the plain text of Title II of the ADA
unambiguously extends to state prison inmates, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed."'
5 4
Following this logic, Congress need not justify or enumerate every element of a
decision. Again, in the narrow domain of Congressional elections, Congress has absolute
and final authority. Specifically, the federal legislature should not be required to justify
its action via a plain statement rule so far as it concerns Congressional elections because
Congress is constitutionally authorized to make final determinations regarding federal
elections, and has thus chosen, through Section 2 of the VRA, to create a flexible, fact
intensive totality of the circumstances test.
The Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal, as well as several District
Courts that considered the VRA and felon disenfranchisement, have analyzed the
presented cases as if the passage of the VRA was merely predicated upon the
Reconstruction Amendments. 155 This is unfortunate because Mitchell, Smiley, Ex Parte
Yarbrough and Classic, together hold Congress to have absolute and ultimate authority to
legislate concerning Congressional elections. The assertions of the plain statement rule
are inapplicable in the Article I, Section 4 context because there are minimal federalism
implications when Congress exercises a legislative authority specifically granted to it by
the original constitution.
A narrow claim of Congressional ballot restoration not only differs from the
Gregory-style plain statement decision,156 but it is also immune from invocations of the
DeBartolo version of the plain statement rule.1 57 Congress, through exercise of its
Article I, Section 4 power, did not create a constitutional challenge because the
Congressional power to displace state voting regulations as to the federal ballot is an
original power vested in the Congress and provided for by the framers of the
Constitution.
In their treatment of the ballot restoration claims, the Second and Eleventh
Circuits failed to apply the VRA to any part of the ballot restoration claims and instead
broadly invoked the plain statement rule.'58 At a minimum, these courts could have
bifurcated the inquiry, thereby dismissing the state ballot restoration claim while ruling
on the substantive merits of the embedded claim for restoration of the federal portion of
the ballot. The final substantive ruling on the merits of the federal ballot claim might
..2 524 U.S. at 212 (citations omitted).
15 Id. (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 213.
'55 For a list of these cases, see supra note 15.
56 See supra note 143.
57 See supra note 142.
158Id.
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prove to be unsuccessful, as it did for the plaintiffs in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits; these
courts broadly applied the VRA but found the local statutes still passed muster in the
totality of the circumstances. 159  These decisions, however, do little to preclude future
claims as the VRA's totality of the circumstances test is a fact intensive inquiry, and there
is substantial variation between states concerning their policies as well as historical
treatment of minority populations.'
60
There is reason to believe a court presented with a pure or embedded federal
voting rights claim could find the VRA applicable and apply the required totality of the
circumstances test and strike down a particular statute. When the facts and the history of
particular state disenfranchisement laws are reviewed, an appropriate record might lead a
court to find a VRA violation and restore access to the federal portion of the electoral
ballot. Section IV of this article, infra, briefly entertains this question, arguing state
systems which permanently restrict all ex-felons from voting fail the VRA's totality of
the circumstances test. Section IV completes a review of the empirical literature
demonstrating how federal ballot restoration could produce a significant effect on
political outcomes.
IV. SCHEMES THAT FAIL THE VRA AND THEIR IMPACT UPON ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
As a by-product of the federal bargain, historical practice, and policy
experimentation, state disenfranchisement laws display a high level of interstate
variance. 161 This extends to a host of relevant parameters including the severity of a
given state's criminal law, the range of crimes subject to disenfranchisement and the
duration of the collateral consequence.162 A reduced-form coding of the duration of such
statutes places them into three major classifications, which are to be adopted by this
article for the sake of simplification. 63 In the least restrictive case, states either forego
disenfranchisement or limit the disenfranchisement to the actual period of
incarceration. 164 This approach has the lowest electoral impact since only incarcerated
felons are denied the vote. In the intermediate case, states disenfranchise offenders
through periods of incarceration and during periods of supervision, such as while on
parole or probation. 65 Finally, the most restrictive form removes the ability to vote for a
period beyond sentence completion, including permanent denial of the franchise.
66
Among this latter group, there is a gradation across jurisdictions. For example, certain
159 Id.
160 See generally, Robert Preuhs, State Felon Disenfranchisement Policy, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 733 (2001). See
also Daniel M. Katz, A Cobblestone of Eligible Electorates: The Elections Clause and the Variance and
Comity in Criminal Disenfranchisement Policy (Paper Presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL) (manuscript on file with author).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See Aman McLeod et al., The Locked Ballot Box: The Impact of State Criminal Disenfranchisement
Laws on African American Voting Behavior and Implications for Reform, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 66,
74-75 (2003) (analyzing disenfranchisement schemes by placing existing statutes into three categories); see
also Katz, supra note 160 (arguing that a true understanding of the severity of felon disenfranchisement
policy requires a review of the interaction between various elements of state law.)
164 McLeod, supra note 163, at 75.
165 Id.
166 id.
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states remove the right to vote for a fixed period beyond parole and probation, while
others permanently remove the franchise. Additionally, some jurisdictions that
permanently remove the franchise do so following conviction for a single felonious
offense, while others require a series of violations. For purposes of reduced-form
classification, these schemes will be treated as analogous. However, litigants should
emphasize to reviewing courts these important differences across jurisdictions.
A. Schemes that Fail the VRA
Born out of Selma and the violent images from that "Bloody Sunday" on the
Edmund Pettis Bridge, 167 the VRA was created to further equity related goals, most
notably, the protection of voting rights within minority communities. The VRA assists in
securing opportunities for political participation and, by necessity, enhances the political
capital needed to secure those rights. By design, the VRA, as amended in 1982, requires
a fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances inquiry. Therefore, it is difficult to make
general predictions regarding the factual threshold required by the VRA in specific cases.
For example, while the history of voting rights is replete with examples of discriminatory
practices aimed at the suppression of minority voting interests, these incidents are not
uniformly distributed across jurisdictions.16
8
The VRA provides specific guideposts for courts rendering decisions based upon
the totality of the circumstances. The Senate report accompanying the VRA enumerates
the following nine factors which reviewing courts might consider in deciding whether
election processes are "equally open to participation" 69 by members of the protected
classes:
167 Leaders within the civil rights community chose Selma, Alabama, because it represented the epitome of
minority disenfranchisement. As of the 1960 census, the voting age population had reached nearly 30,000
persons, distributed as approximately 14,000 whites and 15,000 blacks. Yet, of the 9,877 registered voters
only 335 were black. Prior voter registration efforts in Selma and surrounding communities largely failed.
Following the death of Jimmie Lee Jackson, a young African-American man killed by an Alabama State
Trooper during a march dispersal, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee organized a march from Selma to Montgomery in order to take their
grievances directly to the state capitol. Although the March 7, 1965 march made it no further than six
blocks, it has been called the political and emotional peak of the American civil rights movement. With
reporters and photographers present, state and local law officials proceeded to disband the ostensibly non-
violent march using night sticks, tear gas and bullwhips. That evening, photos of the incident reached the
country and the world, with the attack upon the Selma marchers soon termed "Bloody Sunday." The State
of Alabama's crackdown quickly returned civil rights policy to the forefront. The brutality of the violence
inflicted shock not only on the nation, but also President Johnson, who on March 15, 1965 spoke to a joint
session of Congress, proposing the legislation that ultimately produced the 1965 Voting Rights Act. This
legislation that was born out of Selma produced significant changes in the electoral landscape of the United
States. For a small slice of extensive discussion of Selma and its historical and political significance, see
generally, CHARLES FAGER, SELMA 1965 72-98 (1974); DAVID GARROw, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 368-409 (1986); ROBERT
MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 460-462 (1996); VALELLY, supra note 123, at 193, 198.
168 1d. The legislative findings that accompanied the passage of the Voting Rights Act contain such
evidence. See e.g. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 39 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 217.
169 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2007).
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I) a history of official discrimination;
2) extent of racially polarized voting;
3) extent to which the district has used practices that may increase the
opportunity for discrimination;
4) denials of access to the slating process;
5) discrimination in other areas, such as education, employment or
health;
6) political campaigns characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7) extent of minority representation in elected office;
8) lack of elected official responsiveness to needs of a particular minority
group; and
9) a tenuous link between the disputed practice and state policy.'7 0
These factors are not exhaustive 17 ' and, for the reasons stated above, several of
these factors are so fact specific they can only be analyzed in discrete cases. For a claim
to succeed, the disputed process must cause members of the protected class to have "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 
172
A blanket prohibition of all felon disenfranchisement pursuant to the Article I,
Section 4 enabled VRA could prove illusive. When courts apply the effects test to
disenfranchisement schemes that restrict access to the federal portion of the election
ballot, at least some statutes likely will pass muster under the VRA. The least restrictive
state schemes, such as those that operate over a limited set of crimes and remove the
franchise only during the period of incarceration, are the most likely to survive VRA
analysis. Specifically, the arguments traditionally proffered in support of felon
disenfranchisement are at their strongest when individuals currently incarcerated seek to
exercise the franchise. For example, proponents often cite an interest in restricting voting
to those members of society who will intelligently use the ballot.1 73 Additionally, states
claim an interest in limiting the exercise of the voting privilege to those who have
adhered to the laws crafted from the established democratic process of the United
States. 74 Taken together, and placed against the interests of those currently incarcerated,
courts may be willing to accept these traditional arguments in favor of franchise denial.
As state schemes increase in severity, the strength of the state interest supporting
the removal of the franchise invariably wanes. At the very same time, the magnitude of
the deprivation imposed upon the felon intensifies. Therefore, it is those schemes that
171 S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-207.
171 See id. (noting that these factors are not exhaustive, and further that no specific number of factors need
by proven).
172 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (stating that the essence of a
disenfranchisement claim is that the disputed process causes "an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives").
173 For a discussion of the rationales used to support disenfranchisement, see generally Demleitner, supra
note 2, at 771-74. The arguments forwarded are that those convicted of felonious offenses cast a pale over
their ability to vote intelligently, that although some subset of the offender population could intelligently
exercise their franchise, there is sufficient probability of unintelligent use to justify a blanket ballot
prohibition.
174 id.
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permanently deny the franchise to all felons that are most likely to fail under the VRA.
In these instances, the aforementioned traditional arguments become tenuous 175 and the
loss of liberty for the felon becomes substantial, often disproportionate to the initial
unlawful conduct. Thus, based on a consideration of the remaining factors and some
non-enumerated factors, there is substantial reason to believe a comprehensive VRA
analysis could invalidate schemes which impose lifetime disenfranchisement for all
felony offenders.
Lifetime disenfranchisement schemes are particularly troubling because they have
a massively disproportionate impact on minority populations. 176 The harm is not only
visited on the individual but upon entire voting communities. Because voting is the right
that makes "all other rights significant,"'' 77 when a state provision hinders the ability of
historically disadvantaged groups to participate equally, the explicit factors in the Senate
Report imply that a careful VRA analysis is warranted. Although courts have held
disproportionate impacts alone do not create a per se violation of the VRA, their presence
certainly cannot be completely divorced from the totality of the circumstances inquiry.
Lifetime disenfranchisement schemes are especially problematic because they
lack a basic notion of offense proportionality. While the removal of the franchise
represents the denial of a civil right, this collateral restriction cannot be completely
removed from its penal nature. Under current state criminal justice structures, many
more crimes have felony designations than were historically felonies at common law.
78
175 id.
176 See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SociO. REV. 777, 797-798 (2002) (reprinted below),
(demonstrating the disproportionate impact of schemes that disenfranchise beyond sentence completion).
The disproportionate impact can be seen by comparing the percent of blacks disenfranchised to the
percentage of the overall population that is disenfranchised:
Afr. PercentTotal Afr. Total Afr. Total Total Percent
State Amer. Amer. Amer* Afr. Amer. Ex- Total Voting Disenfran-
Eo Felons Pop. D felons Pop. chisedfelons chised
AL 77,932 111,755 800,000 13.97 148,830 212,650 3,333,000 6.38
AZ 8,651 17,700 137,000 12.92 58,936 149,870 3,625,000 3.89
FL 167,413 256,392 1,600,000 16.02 613,514 827,207 11,774,000 7.03
KY 24,632 35,955 207,000 17.37 109,132 147,434 2,993,000 4.93
MS 50,035 76,106 675,000 11.27 82,002 119,943 2,047,000 5.86
NE 7,164 9,240 49,000 18.86 44,001 53,428 1,234,000 4.43
NV 11,514 17,970 105,000 17.11 43,395 66,390 1,390,000 4.78
NM 7,750 9,128 37,000 24.67 63,565 78,400 1,263,000 6.21
TN 11,946 41,759 635,000 6.58 28,720 91,149 4,221,000 2.16
VA 121,737 161,559 1,005,000 16.08 243,902 312,661 5,263,000 5.90
Note that these percentages remain roughly unchanged if one considers merely disproportionate impacts
upon the ex-felon population.
177 Id. at 777 (quoting FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS STILL DON'T VOTE:
AND WHY POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 2 (Beacon Press 2000)). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886) ("Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded
by society, according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental
political right, because preservative ofall rights. ") (emphasis added).
'78 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 49-52 (1973) (writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist notes
that the Reconstruction Era Congress sought to limit state disenfranchisement to felonies at common law).
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These felonious crimes vary substantially, from simple drug possession to homicide.
Courts might have difficulty with the idea that it is proportional to treat crimes with such
variance in severity as equal for purposes of disenfranchisement.
Proportionality is not an explicit factor contained in the Senate Report;'79
however, factor nine asks a court to consider whether there is a tenuous link between the
disputed practice and the state policy. 180  This factor seems perfectly tailored to
considerations of proportionality. Proportionality requires a comparative relationship, an
investigation for reasonable symmetry or balance among the involved factors. The lack
of proportionality in a state system may help to establish the questionable nature of the
state scheme. Today, many felonies routinely result in probation. Further, some states
designate comparatively minor offenses as felonious. 8 1 It appears inconsistent to deem a
person safe enough to interact daily in society but simultaneously untrustworthy in the
exercise of the franchise. Whether considered through the lens of factor nine or a non-
enumerated VRA factor, the decision to maintain lifetime disenfranchisement raises
serious questions regarding the motivation of state actors who adopted such a system.
Finally, and equally important, substantial research within the criminal justice
field provides additional evidence that lifetime schemes fail factor nine, listed above.
Disenfranchisement statutes do not consider the age of the offender; therefore, offenses
committed even in the late teen years result in the denial of the right to vote for life.
Supporters of felon disenfranchisement often argue the ballot box should remain pure and
thus be reserved for those who will intelligently use the ballot.' 82 Yet, even at a mere
summary statistical level, empirical studies on offense commission argue that as an
offender grows older, the probability of new felony offenses, conditioned upon prior
offense history, rapidly converges upon the unconditioned probability of offense183
commission. In other words, as an offender grows older, the chance of committing a
new felony becomes roughly equal to the probability for one who never committed a
prior offense. This suggests that a state policy permanently removing the franchise is
only tenuously related to its stated goals of ballot box purity and intelligent use of the
franchise.
The disproportionate impact upon minority voting communities, taken together
with the lack of proportionality present in lifetime schemes, gives rise to a strong
argument supporting the invalidation of blanket lifetime disenfranchisement. Following
this reasoning, the courts, in search of a bright line rule, should declare that state schemes
may, at most, remove the Congressional franchise until an offender has completed all
terms of incarceration, parole and probation. This holding would embed a degree of
proportionality currently unrepresented in many state schemes. Specifically, because the
'79 S. REP. No. 97-417, supra note 164, at 28-29.
180 Id.
'8' In Florida, for example, numerous less serious transgressions are classified as felonies, including:
trespassing on posted "commercial horticultur[al]" property, FLA. STAT. § 810.09(2)(e) (2006) killing,
capturing, injuring, or possessing an alligator, FLA. STAT. § 372.663(1) (2006); and removing certain
property encumbered by a lien and valued over $50.00, FLA. STAT. § 713.69 (2006).
182 See Demleitner, supra note 2, at 771-74 (noting that states and courts, including the Supreme Court,
have defended felon disenfranchisement by arguing that it preserves the "purity of the ballot box").
183 See generally, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000, 355, tbl. 4.4 (Ann L. Pastore &
Kathleen Maguire, eds., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001) (displaying the percentage
distributions of persons arrested, as compared to the total U.S. population, by age group).
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total time of incarceration, parole and probation may reflect the underlying seriousness of
the offense, the decision to peg disenfranchisement schemes to gradations already
reflected in the penal law should reduce the taint of the disproportionate impacts created
by the scheme. Simply put, disenfranchisement pegged to the existing system of offense
severity achieves proportionality while still precluding the worst societal offenders from
exercising the franchise. Furthermore, it effectuates the goals of the VRA on the
Congressional ballot while still preserving important notions of state and local autonomy
for the non-federal ballot.
B. The Direct, Indirect and Collateral Impacts Upon Political Outcomes
The return of the Congressional voting franchise to this subset of the felony
offender population may result in important changes in political outcomes. The likely
changes are a function of direct, indirect, and collateral mechanisms. The direct
consequence of ballot restoration is the change in political participation reflected in the
ballots cast by the formerly disenfranchised offender population. The indirect effect of
the return of the franchise encompasses the change in political participation by members
of the non-disenfranchised population. For example, if a family member regains the right
to vote, other family members may elect to join the offender during voting process. The
collateral effect of federal restoration is the possibility that a state may follow the federal
lead by returning the franchise to the same offenders who previously were
disenfranchised under the state law. States may decide it is not practical to have two sets
of ballots, one for the federal offices and the other for the state. The result could be a
new uniform approach merging the state into the Congressional ballot thereby facilitating
the ex-felon's full return to voting. In all, a complete participation model must account
for all of these potential mechanisms in order to speculate thoughtfully on the complete
electoral impacts of federal franchise restoration.
1. Direct Impacts
Modeling the direct change in political outcomes is complicated because it is
unlikely the offender population features a level of political participation equivalent to
the non-offender population. 184  Thus, a participation model must first capture the
predicted level of political participation within the offender population and then
determine the distribution of party preferences across this population subset. Attempts to
determine both participation rates and party preferences face potential measurement
error. They typically rely upon survey research, pre-conviction participation rates or
multiple regression analysis of cross-state voting patterns. 185 However, assuming these
'84 See Uggen & Manza, supra note 176, at 783 (noting that presumption of unit homogeneity in
disenfranchised felon population and their potential voting patterns is oversimplified and a dubious
presumption); see also, Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD.
85, 115 (2004) (noting the ways in which the participation rates of disenfranchised felons differ from the
rates of other groups).
'85 Various methods are typically used to measure voter participation. See Uggen & Manza, supra note 176,
at 783-84. However, each approach is potentially problematic: survey research faces measurement error
associated with respondent misreporting; models built upon pre-conviction treatment rates may fail to
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difficulties can be overcome, the additional number of net votes available for a given
candidate can be compared to pre-existing margins of victory to determine predicted
changes in political outcomes. If the previous margins of victory were relatively close,
there is a greater likelihood of an impact provided that the ex-felon population tends to
vote against this margin of victory.
In their recent study, Professors Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza create a rough
estimate of the upper bound of offender political participation using data collected by the
Current Population Survey (CPS). 186 That rate is then reduced using an inflation factor
obtained from the CPS. 187 This method allows Uggen and Manza to derive conservative
predicted levels of turnout for the offender population. 1
88
With a participation rate in place, the authors run a logistic regression on data
from the National Election Study to determine the distribution of party preferences
among the disenfranchised population. 189 This yields a multiplier that can be applied
against the total number of felons residing within a given jurisdiction in order to
determine the number of net votes available in that jurisdiction.
90
Uggen and Manza applied this framework to each U.S. Senate Election between
1972 and 2000 and calculated the number of net Democratic votes lost in each of these
races. 191 In other words, they looked at how many votes were needed to alter the margin
of victory in those races. In many cases, the large differential between these net votes
and the margin of victory led to the conclusion that felon disenfranchisement was not
outcome determinative.192 However, the authors identify at least seven U.S. Senate races
for which the outcome might have been changed by the presence of enfranchised ex-
felons. 193 Most importantly for purposes of this article, they note that in six of these
seven races, the net votes of ex-felons would have been sufficient to alter outcomes.
94
capture the post-treatment effects of the criminal sanction; and participation models crafted from cross-state
voting tract patterns face additional measurement errors.
' See id. at 784, flh. 6 (indicating CPS data as preferable to the National Election Study (NES), as the NES
"typically overestimates turnout by 18 to 25 percent").
' Id. at 784.
188 See id. (noting with respect to the use of the inflation factor that because turnout is most overrepresented
among the better-educated, inflation rates for disenfranchised felons are likely lower, so this procedure may
produce a conservative estimate).
"9 Id. at 785, app. 799. Categorical models such as the logistic regression are often preferable to the
regression model of ordinary least squares or the linear probability model because its functional form helps
capture the non-linearity present in many empirical phenomena.
190 Id. at 787.
See id. at 788-89 (stating that there have been over 400 senate elections since 1978).
192 Id. at 789.
'93 Id. at 788-789. The seven Senate races in question are:
Year State Result of Senate Race
1978 Virginia J. Wagner (R) defeated Miller (D)
1978 Texas Tower (R) defeated Krueger (D)
1984 Kentucky McConnell (R) defeated Huddleston (D)
1988 Florida Mack (R) defeated Mackay (D)
1988 Wyoming Wallop (R) defeated Vinich (D)
1992 Georgia Coverdell (R) defeated Fowler (D)
1998 Kentucky Bunning (R) defeated Baesler (D)
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The finding of felon disenfranchisement as directly affecting Senatorial elections
is significant. While only reaching a small subset of elections, the literature discussing
the effects of senatorial incumbency argues that these elections may have produced more
lasting change.195 Additionally, there could be an effect as to candidate selection and,
perhaps, the balance of power within the Congress. 96
It is important to note that while the work of Uggen and Manza is certainly
strong, it is not the only empirical scholarship on the subject of outcomes. In contrast to
Uggen and Manza, Professor Thomas Miles employs a slightly different methodological
approach. Using the triple differences framework, 1 7  Miles finds current
disenfranchisement schemes do not create discemable, direct political consequences.1
98
In support of this empirical finding, the author provides a theoretical offering: he argues
the correlation between socioeconomic factors that lead to criminal activity and low
levels of political participation are such that electorally significant political participation
among the re-enfranchised population is improbable. 199 In other words, although the
aggregate disenfranchised population is theoretically sufficient to create significant
changes in some political outcomes, their predicted level of political participation under
the Miles framework is so small that outcome determinative changes are unlikely to
follow.
Thus, there is a split of authority on the direct impacts question.200  Although
Presidential elections are not the focus of this article, it is an area worth noting; the 2000
Presidential election represents at least one example where the presence of this particular
type of felon disenfranchisement scheme was almost certainly outcome determinative.20'
The 2000 Presidential election featured the closest race in modem election history. With
just a few electoral votes and only 535 popular votes in the key state of Florida separating
the respective candidates the mantra of every vote in the State of Florida rang with
Only in the 1992 race between Coverdell (R) and Fowler (D) would the ex-felon population have been
insufficient to impact the predicted candidate selection. Id.
194 Id. at 789.
195 The incumbency effect hypothesis argues that incumbent candidates have a far higher probability of
electoral success than their non-incumbent challengers. For a survey of the extant literature, see MORRIS
FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1989). Recent work indicates that
the incumbency effect applies beyond senatorial elections; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & James Snyder,
The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000, 1
ELECT L. J. 213 (2002) (finding statistically significant evidence that since the 1940s, the incumbency
advantage has climbed steadily for all state and federal elections).
196 See generally, Uggen & Manza, supra note 176 (finding restoration of felon franchise might have had
both an effect on candidate selection as well as in power structure in Congress).
197 See Miles, supra note 184, at 100 (using the triple differences framework to compare "the turnout of
African-Americans and whites (the first difference) and of males and females (the second difference) in
states with and without laws permanently disenfranchising ex-felons (the third difference)").
198 See id. at 115 (finding that state disenfranchisement does not limit African-American male voter
turnout).
'
99 Id. at 115-16.
200 The State of Florida recently restored the voting rights of nearly one million residents. See Goodnough,
supra note 17. This should allow for future research that will help adjudicate between these competing
empirical claims.
201 See Uggen & Manza, supra note 176, at 792 (finding that the small margin of victory in the 2000
Presidential election would likely have been a small loss if felon re-enfranchisement would have been
adopted).
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particular strength. Florida law, during the 2000 election, provided for permanent
removal of the franchise following the commission of a single felonious offense. 20 2 Only
a relatively small number of ex-felons achieved the return of the franchise, as, prior to
recent events,20 3 state law required specific clemency from the Governor. 20 4  Thus,
although virtually all of the scholarship available recognizes that offenders feature lower
levels of political participation, the preclusion of a predicted 800,000 or more persons
from the 2000 Florida voting rolls 20 5 lead to the unambiguous conclusion that
disenfranchisement changed the electoral outcome of the 2000 Presidential Election.
Specifically, if just one percent of this denied population participated in the election and
split their votes 57 percent to 43 percent in favor of Vice President Al Gore, this margin
would have been sufficient to change the outcome.
20 6
2. Indirect Impacts
Neither the Miles nor the Uggen and Manza models capture the indirect changes
in political participation. However, a complete model should capture both the direct and
indirect impacts. Specifically, the restoration of federal voting rights could create a
multiplier or network effect upon political participation which is not captured by a model
focused exclusively upon direct impacts. 20 7 For example, since many individuals vote as
part of other sub-units such as families and communities, the restoration of the franchise
to one member of the sub-unit may act as the marginal inducement necessary to produce
political participation by other members of the unit. In short, a family member who has
newly regained the vote may encourage other family members to vote. 
°8
Recent empirical scholarship has made initial attempts to determine the presence,
as well as the magnitude, of this indirect impact upon political participation. 209  The
authors focused their attention on the indirect impacts imposed upon the African-
202 FLA. STAT. § 97.041(2)(b) (2006).
203 See Goodnough, supra note 17.
204 FL. CONST. art. VI, § 4, art. IV, § 8(a). To encourage restoration of franchise, the Florida legislature
passed a statute, FLA. STAT. § 944.293, directing that upon discharge from supervision, ex-felons would be
assisted in obtaining and completing forms necessary to request clemency from the Governor. This was
fought by the Governor's Office, finally resulting in a 2004 court order directing the assistance. Florida
Caucus of Black State Legislators, Inc. v. Crosby, 877 So. 2d 861, 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). This
order was subsequent to the 2000 Presidential election.
205 See Uggen & Manza, supra note 176, at 792 (indicating that the large number of disenfranchised could
have had a large impact upon the results from Florida in the 2000 election).
206 These vote shares and rates of participation are exceedingly conservative. For example, the scholarship
of Miles, as well as Uggen and Manza, supports political participation thresholds that far exceed one
0ercent.
, See generally, Robert Huckfeldt, Political Participation and Neighborhood Social Context, 23 AM.
J.POL. Sci. 579 (1979) (asserting that the political process does not operate in isolation, but that
participation has effects beyond the simple direct effect of casting a vote); Scott D. McClurg, Social
Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in Explaining Political Participation,
56 POL. RES. Q. 449(2003) (noting influence of social networks on political participation); M. Stephen
Weatherford, Interpersonal Networks and Political Behavior, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 117(1982) (indicating
broader context of political participation than direct voting effects).
208 The recent restoration of ex-felons in Florida should provide an opportunity to test these important
questions empirically. See Goodnough, supra note 17.
209 See generally, McLeod et al., supra note 163.
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American community by states with restrictive felon disenfranchisement schemes. The
study controlled for a variety of factors previously determined to have impacts on an
individual's propensity to vote. Included in these factors was a proxy variable reflecting
the amount of political oppression within a given jurisdiction. With these controls in
place, the study was able to isolate the indirect impact upon political participation created
by existing disenfranchisement statutes.
This recent research has found strong evidence of a relationship between
restrictive criminal disenfranchisement statutes and turnout among non-disenfranchised
communities.21 ° While the exact causal relationship is difficult to isolate, this evidence
suggests that removal of franchise creates a network effect that downwardly adjusts the
propensity for non-disenfranchised members of the same family or community to cast a
ballot. This is an indication that the vote from non-disenfranchised people may be
suppressed by relation or close social connection to a disenfranchised individual.
Despite this evidence, it is certainly possible that a network effect will not follow; the
recent restoration of nearly one million ex-felons in Florida should help to enlighten this
particular empirical debate.
3. The Collateral Return of the State Franchise
In addition to the direct and indirect impacts upon political participation created
by the restoration of the federal franchise, there also remains a genuine potential for the
ancillary return of the state franchise. First, momentum created by a court's decision
might persuade state legislatures that sentence expiration is the appropriate upper bound
to place upon individuals seeking to vote on the state portion of the election ballot.
Second, the administrative complexities associated with the potential management of two
voting rolls and two ballots could cause states legislatures to embrace a common
approach for voting in state elections. Since the federal ballot would have specific
requirements, the state simply may conform, possibly for reasons as pedestrian as ease
and expense of maintaining a single ballot process.
V. CONCLUSION
The return of the Congressional franchise is a partial-but by no means total-
solution to complete franchise restoration. Because significant questions remain
regarding the VRA's ability to reach the state ballot, and the Supreme Court has yet to
address the question fully, this article focuses on a narrow matter, what could be called
the low hanging fruit of this line of jurisprudence. It advances a construction that both
lower courts and the Supreme Court could find to be the principled intermediate option
that eliminates the least justifiable forms of disenfranchisement while still preserving
some commitment to federalism in those instances of a more justifiable basis to
disenfranchise.
The limited remedy sought in this article, if successful, still represents the return
of Congressional voting rights to well over seven hundred thousand Americans.
2 11
2 10 id.
211 See Uggen & Manza, supra note 176, at 796 (noting 1.8 million disenfranchised African-Americans as
of December 31, 2000); see also JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, supra note 2, at 7 (estimating that
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Therefore, litigants who argue for the total elimination of criminal disenfranchisement
should also explicitly present this alternative or lesser included argument. Namely, a
long line of historical precedents, the text of Article I, Section 4 of the United States
Constitution, and the history surrounding the 1982 amendments to the VRA, as well as
basic notions of proportionality and justice, all require that with respect to the
Congressional portion of the election ballot, courts should use the Voting Rights Act to
eliminate state schemes which disenfranchise individuals beyond the end of their criminal
sentences.
over 5 million adults in the United States are disenfranchised). Even if these estimates are downwardly
adjusted by the recent restoration in Florida, the estimated ex-felon population still exceeds seven hundred
thousand.
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